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Abstract
There is much discussion and debate about how to improve the security and
privacy of mobile communication systems, both voice and data. Most proposals
attempt to provide incremental improvements to systems that are deployed today.
Indeed, only incremental improvements are possible, given the regulatory, techno-
logical, economic, and historical structure of the telecommunications system. In
this paper, we conduct a “thought experiment” to redesign the mobile communi-
cations system to provide a high level of security and privacy for the users of the
system. We discuss the important requirements and how a different architecture
might successfully satisfy them. In doing so, we hope to illuminate the possibili-
ties for secure and private systems, as well as explore their real limits.
1 Introduction
As the use of mobile communications devices has increased, many people have be-
come more concerned with the privacy of such conversations. Most recently, talk about
location-based services has raised the issue even further, particularly as more people re-
alize that mobile phones are easily tracked—in fact, the current architecture of mobile
phone systems essentially requires that they be tracked.
As the global telecommunications system has evolved, including the mobile com-
munications system, successive improvements have typically not been designed with
security and privacy in mind. For example, technological and economic choices by
telecommunications providers often made it possible for governments (and others, in
some cases) to eavesdrop on conversations and obtain call history information. Over
the past hundred years, in fact, bodies of government laws and regulations have grown
up to institutionalize these abilities, despite changes in the underlying technology.
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The privacy issues become more acute with mobile systems. For example, it is
now much easier for an individual to eavesdrop on cell phones (although doing so
is regulated). Location-based services remind mobile phone users that they can be
tracked. New threats are appearing, and old threats are becoming more visible.
Discussions about how to improve the privacy of the mobile communications net-
work typically focus either on regulatory approaches or layered technologies. While it
is certainly important to consider and enact policies to protect privacy, such regulations
essentially mean: “we know you have this information, but you may only disclose it
to specified parties under specified circumstances.” From a user’s point of view, such
protection is, of course, rather limited.
An alternative approach to protecting privacy is to make it difficult, if not impos-
sible, for anyone to collect the information in the first place. The means to do this are
primarily technological, but not entirely. Layered technology approaches, such as en-
crypting phones, are one approach, but their effectiveness is limited by the underlying
infrastructure.
In this article, we propose a communications network architecture designed for
security and privacy. The architectural approach is to separate the network (provid-
ing connectivity) from the service (providing authentication, billing, and so forth).
Common carriers provide the network, while the user can choose among many service
providers based on their pricing, provisions for privacy, and service offerings. Security
and privacy are provided because the network cannot know the identity of the users,
the service cannot know the user location, and (by virtue of end-to-end encryption), no
one but the correspondents can know the content of their communications.
An important goal of this work is to explore the limits on how much security and
privacy can be achieved in a large communications network. Even if the system is
unrealistic, or simply impractical to deploy in place of the existing system, such an
exploration can help Understanding these limits helps to measure the effectiveness of
other approaches
In order to focus our discussion, we focus mainly on the technologies and policies
in the United States, although the fundamental issues of both are global in nature. We
also focus primarily on mobile voice communications, although many of these ideas
can clearly be applied to stationary phones and to data networks, whether stationary or
mobile.
2 Mobile Communications Today
The current wireless networks in North America are based on “cells”, which divide a
telephone service territory into small regions for efficient use of low-power transmitters
with minimum interference. The end user devices are generally dumb (indeed, the
industry calls them ”terminals”) and intelligence—that is, call management, routing,
and other services—is lodged in the network. A simplified architecture of the cellular
network is shown in Figure 1. A much longer discussion of current telecommunications
systems can be found in Tomlinson [4].
When a cell phone is turned on, it locates a nearby cell, which tells it what channels
to use and what transmit power to use. As a phone moves, it will repeat this process as
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Figure 1: Simplified Architecture of the Cellular Phone System
it enters new cells. Phones identify themselves to the network using a unique ID, called
an electronic serial number, or (ESN). The ID is mapped to a phone number within the
network. A common attack on cell phone systems to obtain fraudulent service is known
as “cloning,” in which the ESN is duplicated for another phone.
For billing, the network where the phone is located sends a billing record to the
phone’s service provider. The raw call detail records are translated according to rates
and plans into particular charges for the end user. The carriers also settle accounts with
each other for the services incurred on the other’s network. End users typically pay a
combination of monthly service charge and per-minute charges, although prepaid plans
with only per-minute charges are becoming more popular.
The various wireless network technologies in current use have very different ap-
proaches to security. Early analog cell phones have essentially no security capabilities.
The North American digital standards have voice privacy using encryption, but the sys-
tem is notoriously weak. The European GSM standards also support voice encryption,
but they are subject to a variety of straightforward attacks.
In the U.S., the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has required that lo-
cation information be available for all mobile phones by October 31, 2001. While the
FCC’s regulation was primarily intended to be used for locating a phone used to call
for help in an emergency, service providers are looking for ways to take advantage of
the information to generate revenue.
3 Security and Privacy in Mobile Communications
Every day, telephones are used millions of times for private discussions, whether busi-
ness secrets or personal affairs. Most of the time, the speakers give little thought to the
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security or privacy of their communications. What are the issues in a typical call?
First, the parties do not necessarily have a good idea who the other one is. When
speaking to others they know, people can identify them by voice. Beyond that, there is
no real authentication in the system. Many people easily accept any identification given
to them on the phone: “I’m from the IRS, and we’re just checking up on a problem with
your tax return. Could you give me your Social Security number?” Similarly, there is
no certainty that calling a phone number gets to the right person or organization, though
it is admittedly harder to persuade someone to call a spoofed number.
Second, someone else may be eavesdropping on the conversation, whether by a
wiretap or by intercepting a conversation broadcast by a cell phone or cordless phone.1
Existing standards for voice privacy on digital (but not analog) phones provide some
protection, but not against a determined attacker. In practice, the technology discour-
ages simple scanning and opportunistic eavesdropping.
Third, billing records provide an audit trail held by the service provider of calls
made and received, and the phone number (though not the actual personal identity) of
the other party. These records are often used by law enforcement, and sometimes in
other circumstances as well.
Fourth, caller ID (CID) and automatic number information (ANI) reveals the phone
number of the caller to the recipient. While we don’t dispute the usefulness of caller
ID, it does reveal information that the caller may wish to keep private. Symmetrically,
having a single phone number used for multiple calls, or by different callers, may link
together information that the recipient may wish to keep private.
Fifth, the weak authentication of devices in the system makes fraud possible. The
mobile telecommunications industry has spent an enormous amount of money to com-
bat fraud by putting more intelligence in the network. Here it is important to note a
critical distinction about authentication: devices (e.g., phones) can be authenticated to
the network as legitimate, and users can be authenticated to each other, regardless of
the phones they are using. In fact, it is only important for the device to be authenticated
to the network to link it to a billing account in the current architecture. We will return
to this problem below.
Finally, it is important to note that solving many of these security problems requires
an end-to-end approach. That is, the security relationship exists between the end users
(or, at least, the end devices), not with parts of the network. For example, consider a
system that encrypts the signal between a wireless phone and the cellular base station,
and then encrypts the signal from the base station through the phone network. The
security is not end-to-end, because the an intermediate system—the base station—has
access to the clear version. This approach to system design is described in more detail
by Saltzer et al [3].
These problems of security and privacy are fundamental aspects of the telecommu-
nications system, and we can measure the effectiveness of a given system for security
by how well it eliminates each threat.
1Note: in this paper we do not address the security or privacy of communications between cordless
phones and their base stations.
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4 Legal Environment
Historically, in the United States, security and privacy of mobile communications has
passed through a number of phases. Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934
says:
...no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any com-
munication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, pur-
port, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any per-
son...
In other words, it was not illegal to listen to a call, but it was illegal to tell any-
one about it. Scanner and short-wave enthusiasts had free rein of the airwaves for
the next fifty years. In 1984, however, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA) changed the situation to make it illegal to “intentionally intercept...any wire,
oral, or electronic communication..” While the act does provide for some exceptions,
the law essentially made it illegal to listen to another’s conversation without autho-
rization. Later, the Telecommunications Disclosure & Dispute Resolution Act of 1992
made it illegal to manufacture or sell equipment that was capable of receiving cellular
or cordless telephones.
Notwithstanding these U.S. restrictions on the public intercepting wireless commu-
nications, the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA)
requires that carriers implement and as necessary modify their equipment to facilitate
the ability of the government to intercept communications. An FCC report on the law
stated:
Specifically, section 103(a) of CALEA requires that “a telecommu-
nications carrier shall ensure that its equipment, facilities, or services that
provide a customer or subscriber with the ability to originate, terminate, or
direct communications” are capable of (1) expeditiously isolating the con-
tent of targeted communications transmitted by the carrier within its ser-
vice area; (2) expeditiously isolating information identifying the origin and
destination of targeted communications; (3) transmitting intercepted com-
munications and call identifying information to law enforcement agencies
at locations away from the carrier’s premises; and (4) carrying out inter-
cepts unobtrusively, so that targets are not made aware of the interception,
and in a manner that does not compromise the privacy and security of other
communications. [1].
In a sense, the primary purpose of CALEA was to preserve the ability of the U.S.
government and other law enforcement organizations to conduct wiretaps and trace
telephone calls, an ability that was jeopardized by evolving technology. Much more
background on wiretaps and communications policy can be found in Diffie and Lan-
dau [2].
Separately, the U.S. government has historically discouraged the use of encryption.
While the official policy of the U.S. government is that no restrictions be placed on the
ability of its citizens to use encryption technology, it has long placed fairly stringent
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controls on the export of encryption technology. This has effectively discouraged the
sale of encryption systems in the U.S. market as well. Both the export regulations and
the market conditions for encryption system have changed in recent years, but such
devices as encrypting phones are still not widely available.
In summary, while it is not illegal for end users to communicate securely, govern-
ment policies effectively discourage such systems. In particular, telecommunications
carriers are prohibited from offering secure services to a broad market, leaving the
burden of security entirely on the end users.
5 Requirements and Desiderata
Now we turn to the requirements for a secure and private mobile communications sys-
tem. In addition to the basic security requirements described earlier in section 3, there
are several important requirements for the different players in the communications net-
work. For our simplified architecture, we look at required and desired properties for
four kinds of participants: end users (including application providers), carriers, and
governments.
5.1 For End Users
In this system, the category of “end users” includes people who make and receive tele-
phone calls, as well as application providers. Applications providers are those who
are providing some service (that is, an application) over the communications network.
We use the term “application provider” instead of “service provider” to avoid confu-
sion with those providing telecommunications services (i.e., carriers). The simplest
case of an application provider is just a person answering a telephone call, but other
applications may be quite different.
System requirements for end users include:
1. No one else should be able to bill calls to another account. In addition, a stolen
phone should be useless, thus discouraging theft.
2. The network should keep no record of calls sent or received, but the user should
have access to complete call detail information. This implies that there are no
records about uses of digital information services.
3. It should not be possible to record a clear version of a conversation or data ses-
sion.
4. It should not be possible to discover the location of a user, but the user should be
able to release her location as desired. For example, a stalker with access to the
network should not be able to track an individual.
5. It should not be possible to identify the end user or the end device. For example,
a device should not have a static ESN. 2
2This does not rule out “fingerprinting” the device based on its transmission characteristics, although it
is possible to build devices that alter their characteristics over time, making fingerprinting difficult, if not
impossible.
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6. Location information is not normally available to anyone, except that the network
does know the location of a device that is transmitting at a particular time. Users
can choose to release location information to application providers, or it can be
automatically released for a call to emergency services.
In a sense, these are the most important requirements in the system, because it is
the security and privacy of the end users that concerns us here. Of course, some of
them imply a requirement for end-to-end security, since the network is not trusted.
5.2 For Carriers
Telecommunications carriers obviously have many requirements for the systems that
they will build and operate, and they must certainly be concerned with building scal-
able, reliable systems. For the architectural discussion here, we focus on some funda-
mental requirements that make it possible to operate the service as a business.
1. Carriers should be paid for providing services.
2. The system should have adequate defenses against fraud.
3. There must be mechanisms for naming and addressing end devices, and for rout-
ing the communications.
4. It should be possible to provide add-on features, such as voice mail, call forward-
ing, etc.
We are specifically omitting many aspects of regulated telecommunications ser-
vices, such as universal service, regulated pricing, etc., since they are not directly rele-
vant to this architectural proposal.
5.3 For Governments
The primary requirements for governments and telecommunications systems are as
follows:
1. Provide location information for emergency services
2. Provide access to communications and information about communications for
law enforcement
3. Provide a robust infrastructure for use in emergencies
Satisfying the first requirement is an important aspect of the architecture described
below. The second is problematic. Certainly society has an interest in catching crim-
inals, but we strongly oppose the notion that everyone’s privacy must suffer to make
law enforcement’s job easier. We believe that the benefits to society given by remov-
ing security and privacy from the network are outweighed by the risks of giving the
government too much power. The current executive and judicial branches and their
agencies are, we are sure, staffed only by people with the highest honor and integrity,
but it has not always been so, and may not be again.
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6 An Architectural Proposal
Our proposed architecture has three main components: the wireless device (phone), the
network, and the service. The role of the network is to provide the raw communications
fabric among wireless devices and between wireless devices and wireline carriers. The
network does not know the identity of the users and does not have a persistent
identifier for the devices. The role of the service is to provide a directory linking the
identity of the users to the transient identifiers of wireless devices and to provide for
billing and other advanced features. The role of the phone is to manage the end-to-
end encryption of communications. A high-level diagram of the system architecture is
shown in Figure 2.
Wireless
Network
Interconnection
Network
(Internet) Wireless
Service
ProviderDirectory
Wireless
Network
Wireless
Service
Provider
Figure 2: Proposed System Architecture
The easiest way to introduce the architecture is to follow the life cycle of a call.
When a device (phone) first becomes active, it establishes an anonymous relation-
ship with the network. In effect the network assigns a transient ESN, or TESN, to
the device. The TESN will be used by the device for as long as it wants. A privacy-
conscious device might change its TESN for every call, in order to avoid linking the
TESN to an identifiable succession of calls.
Because service has not yet been established, the device cannot make general con-
nections (except perhaps for emergency calls). However, the device is allowed a digital
connection to the service supplier of its choice (for convenience, these are identified by
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URLs). The connection between the device and the service supplier is made over an
end-to-end encrypted channel, so neither other users nor the network itself can intercept
the communications.
The service provider and the device agree on services and payments. The service
provider will, in turn, pay the network fees for the activities of the device with the
particular TESN.
In order to make a call, the originating device uses the dialed identifier (the phone
number) to look up the service provider of the destination device in a directory. That
service provider is in a position to supply the destination device’s current network
provider and the current TESN within that network. The originating device can now
establish an end-to-end encrypted connection to the destination device.
6.1 Naming, addressing, and routing
In older telephone networks, names, addresses, and routes were essentially the same: a
telephone number. One dialed a particular number (naming), that number was assigned
to a particular phone somewhere (addressing), and the number included information
on how to route the call (country code, area code, exchange, local identifier). Human-
sensible naming was handled outside the system through paper directories.
In the modern wireless network, names are represented by telephone numbers, ad-
dresses by ESNs, and routing is managed by the network. Human-sensible names are
still handled outside the system through paper directories and increasingly through on-
line directories. In addition, almost every device has a built-in local directory for speed
dialing.
We propose a complete dissociation of naming, addressing, and routing that is quite
analogous to the methods used by Internet electronic mail (see sidebar).
Routing Electronic Mail
How does email get from a sender to “someone@domain.com”? Electronic mail on
the Internet uses the following iterative algorithm:
• The originator uses the Domain Name System (DNS) to locate the name of a
computer that handles mail for domain.com.
• The originator then uses the DNS to locate an IP address for that computer.
• The originator transmits the message to the mail server for domain.com.
• The mail server then has two options: it can deliver the email to a local mailbox,
or it may translate the recipient name “somebody” into another email address
and begins again.
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6.1.1 Naming
Naming will be handled by multiple layers of directories. Devices will have a search
path of directories. The dialed name is given to each directory in the search path in
turn, until a directory either responds with a translation into a new name, a translation
into an address, or a new directory to try. A directory will typically be identified by a
URL that responds to the directory lookup protocol. Thus, the “normal” path through
the name lookup system will typically require the following steps:
• Look up a name in local device directory (e.g., the speed dial directory), which
will translate the dialed name “Mom” into her public 3 directory entry.
• Look up the public directory entry in the given public directory to obtain Mom’s
service provider and her ID within that provider.
• Look up mom’s service-provider-specific-id in the service provider’s directory
to obtain mom’s current address.
This design provides a number of interesting opportunities:
• A person does not need to place an entry in a public directory. Instead, one can
place an entry in private directories of one’s own choosing.
• Directory entries can be have limited access, so that only people with appropriate
permissions can call you. Indeed, the full power of directory systems such as
LDAP can be brought to bear, so that it is easy, for example, to grant calling
permission to groups, not just to individuals. Of course, such a system would
require authentication in order to make a decision about access.
• A person can have many directory entries, in the same or different directories.
This makes it easy to, for example, to give individual names to different callers,
which in turn makes it possible control, route, or avoid calls from particular
callers.
• The lookup process can be delegated to servers on the network, so that the pro-
cess can avoid multiple round trips to wireless devices with lower bandwidth and
greater latency.
By disassociating names in this way, the mechanism becomes both more flexible
and more private, particularly because names can be created for short-term use and for
giving to specific callers for future use.
6.1.2 Addressing and Routing
Addresses in this system are anonymous and transient. End devices can change ad-
dresses as often as desired simply by informing their network (to enable routing and
billing) and by informing their service provider (to enable name translation and billing).
3public in the sense of open to anyone
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An address has the form <network identifier:TESN>, which provides the carrier net-
work with enough information to handle routing.
Routing will be the province of the networks, and it is their responsibility to deliver
data to the correct device given its address.
6.2 Payment
The end user pays the service provider under whatever terms and using whatever mech-
anism they have negotiated, whether that be billing, credit card, or digital cash. Sim-
ilarly, the service provider pays the network using a negotiated mechanism. In this
system, it is possible for service providers to pay in near real-time using a digital cash
system. By doing so, it is possible to have service providers who need not keep billing
records, and therefore leave no information about what calls were made.
By separating the payment stages in this way, the connection between the end user
and the network is broken: the network cannot identify the end-user. While the end-
user may have limited choice of networks, he can choose from many alternative service
providers, selecting one based on price, privacy, services offered, or quality of customer
service.
6.3 Call privacy
Security of the content of calls will be based on end-to-end encryption. For the pur-
poses of the current paper, we will assume that the encryption algorithm for call con-
tent is secure, so that the primary problem is agreement on a session key. This is more
difficult than it sounds because while two remote devices can easily agree on a key,
using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm, for example, the process is subject
to man-in-the-middle attacks unless the end devices have a way to authenticate each
other. Alice is trying to call Bob, but man-in-the-middle Martin pretends to be Bob to
Alice, and pretends to be Alice, to Bob. In other words, unless we exercise sufficient
care, the caller will get a secure connection, but maybe not to the correct destination.
There are several approaches to this problem, all of which are embodied in various
other systems today:
• Meet in person. Any two phones, if brought together so that their owners can
authenticate each other, can agree on keys for use in future calls.
• Public key certificates signed by a certificate authority and stored in a directory.
A certificate attests to the binding between a key and a name.’ Because these
certificates are signed by a well known public key (that of the CA), anyone can
check them and tampering in the directory is difficult.
• PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) certificates are similar to the public key certificates
referred to previously, except that there is no Certificate Authority. Instead, PGP
relies on a “web of trust”. Anyone can sign a key and the software will look for
a chain of signatures leading to a signature you recognize. If you call the same
folks frequently, it is easy to build up to high-quality authentication.
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• Self-signed certificates. A self-signed certificate is a way of tying together a
name and a key, but anyone can create a self-signed certificate for any name they
choose and place it in a directory. The defense against this attack is for devices to
periodically check their own entries to assure their accuracy. In case the bad guys
have subverted the directory to respond correctly only to such queries, devices
should use a proxy to check the directory entries.
• Anonymous key exchange. While subject to man-in-the-middle attacks, this ap-
proach prevents eavesdropping attacks. Authentication could be accomplished
by other means over the secure channel.
• SSH approach. In the SSH (“secure shell”) approach, the web Secure Session
Layer algorithm is used, but with self-signed certificates for each end of the
connection. There is no special attempt to authenticate the initial connection
(beyond trusting the naming and addressing systems) but since SSH remembers
the certificates, it is easy to re-authenticate.
Ultimately, the end devices themselves (with some help from the end users) are
responsible for the privacy of the communications. Service providers or the network
itself might facilitate authentication, though the end users would obviously be required
to trust them to some extent.
6.4 Service Provider
The service provider fulfills two essential functions:
• Mapping directory entries to transient network addresses
• Providing payment to the network carrier
The service provider may also provide value added services such as
• Providing a customer statement with call detail
• Forwarding calls for privacy
• Voice mail
Let us consider two examples of service providers, occupying opposite ends of the
privacy spectrum.
6.4.1 Traditional Service Provider
The traditional service provider makes wireless service under the new architecture look
much like current service. The phone is given a more or less permanent number, and
the service provides a directory which translates that number into the phone’s current
transient ESN. The service provider accepts billing records from network carriers for
the phone’s activities, pays the carriers, and provides a traditional detailed billing state-
ment for the end user. The identity of the end-user is well known.
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6.4.2 High-Privacy Service Provider
The high-privacy service provider goes to extreme lengths to safeguard the privacy of
the end-user. This service provider is much like a current phone card operator, except
that the user can receive calls as well as place them.
• The service provider does not know the end-user identity, instead having a (dig-
ital) cash relationship with the customer.
• The provider creates, as requested, any number of single-use ids which map to
the phone’s transient ESN. The end-user can give out a different “phone number”
to every correspondent.
• The service provider can operate a relay service, so that calls are relayed through
a static location, thus concealing from the remote end even the transient ESN.
The relay does not have access to call content - that is still end-to-end encrypted.
• The service provider can pay network carriers with cash, and consequently have
no need to retain billing records.
• The service provider does not provide statements.
Between these two extremes is a wide variety of opportunities for service providers
to stake out markets based on price, payment options, privacy of customer records, etc.
7 Can we get there from here?
Is this a realistic system? Is it one that could be deployed as an evolution of the current
infrastructure? From a technical point of view, we think the answer is yes. The major
changes needed to implement this architecture are in the billing and directory systems,
and in the deployment of devices that are capable of secure communications. Because
wireless networks are already capable of managing call routing to ESNs that suddenly
appear on their network, the core infrastructure does not change much. It should also
be possible to phase in many of the changes proposed here, so it is not necessary to
have a brand-new system deployed at once.
The economic case is somewhat harder. In part, this is because the architecture
depends somewhat on separating some functions—the service provider and the carrier
network—that are often combined today (albeit ones that are interconnected with other
carriers). There is no obvious incentive for companies to unbundle their current ser-
vices to implement the proposed architecture. A second problem is that changing the
system to improve security would likely cost more for customers, and it is not clear
that customers would value the security and privacy improvements enough to pay for
them.
Finally, as we have noted, the legal and regulatory systems, in the U.S. as well as
other countries, discourage secure communications. In fact, carriers implementing the
proposals described here might possibly be in violation of CALEA.
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8 Conclusions
Today’s mobile communication system provides few assurances about the security and
privacy of one’s communications. In this paper, we have proposed a high-level sys-
tem architecture for a communications system that does provide strong guarantees for
security and privacy for end users. We believe that the architecture is technologically
feasible to deploy on a large scale, but the current market and legal environments will
certainly not encourage its use.
This proposal demonstrates, however, that it is possible to have such strong guaran-
tees. Therefore, when technologists, policy makers, and businesspeople are evaluating
options to increase security and privacy in the telecommunications network, they can
use the strong guarantees as a benchmark for comparison in how effective the options
are.
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